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Continuity and Change in Ciskei Cheifship. J.B.Peires.
The conventional wisdom of South African ethnologists, whether
liberal or conservative, has been dominated by the idea that African politics
operated according to certain fixed rules ("customs") which were hallowed by
tradition and therefore never changed.*• A corollary of this is that if
these rules were correctly identified and fairly applied, everyone would
be satisfied and chiefship could perhaps be saved.2 it is, however, fairly
well established that genealogies are often falsified, that new rules are
coined and old rules bent to accommodate changing configurations of power,
. and that * age-old' customs may turn out to be fairly recent innovations;
i in short, that "organisational ideas do not directly control action, but
only the interpretation of action".3 The conventional wisdom was success-
fully challenged by Comaroff in his important article, 'Chiefship in a
South African Homeland1, which demonstrated that by adhering too closely
to the formal features of traditional government and politics among the
Tswana, especially those concerning succession, the Government wrecked the
political processes which had enabled the Tswana to choose the most suitable
candidate as chief.^ And yet Comaroff*s article begs a good many questions.
Let us imagine that the Government ethnologists read the article, and as &
; V result allow Tsvana chiefs to compete for office as before, permitting
IB-
I
i "consultative decision-making and participation in executive processes".^
Would this prevent the Tswana chiefship from dying? Can we, in fact, discuss
chiefship In political terms alone without considering whether the material
conditions in which it flourished still exist? The present article will
attenpt to situate the question of chiefship in e somewhat wider framework
than that usually provided by administrative theory or transacttonal
analysis. •-
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The Ciskei - Historical Background 6
The last effective Paramount Chief of all Che Xhosa (not to be confused
with the Mpondo, Thembu, Mpondomise, Mfengu, nil of whom are today lumped
together as Xhosa) vas Phalo (reigned c. 1715-1775). By the time of his death
his kingdom stretched from east of the Mbashe river to vest of Fort Beaufort
and the bushmans River* The various chiefs of the royal Tshave clan
competed with each other for followers and prestige subject to his loose
authority. During Phalo's reign, a quarrel between his sons, Ccaleka (d.1778)
and Fharhabc (d.1782) laid the foundations of a split vhich divided the Xhosa
into two great sections, the amaGcaleka of the east and the amaRharhabe of the
vest. Vet another dynastic quarrel split the ataaRharhabe into the amaKgqika a:
the atcaNdlambe (War of Thuthula, 1807-8). During the frontier wars of the
early nineteenth century, a political and territorial wedge was driven between
the amaGcaleka and the amaPharliabc. In 1847, the Rharhabe territory was
annexed as 'British Kaffraria', the forerunner of the modern Ciskei, whereas
the amaGcaleka, vho were driven across the Eel, were eventually incorporated
into the Transkei. A corridor of white settlement (comprising modern East
London - Stutterheim - Queenstown) kept the two apart. As a result, the
Rharhabe chief (sometimes called the Kgqika chief)v became recognised as a
second Paramount, junior to the Ccaleka Paramount. The position was further
complicated when, at the end of the Frontier War of 1878-9, the Colonial
Government drove all the amaNgqika into the Kentani District of the Tr&nskei,
leaving the Ciskei to the Mfengu and to other ana Rharhabe (such as the
amalldlambe) whom it considered politically more reliable.
The other ethnic group in the Ciskei, usually called the Mfengu (a
naite they generally dislike), is actually composed of several distinct Nguni-
speaking peoples, the most important of which are the Bhale, the Zi«i and the
Hlubi. They fled Natal at tbe time of Tshaka's wars (1818-1828) and entered
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Xhosfl country, seeking service. As a client group, they were certainly not
treated on an equal footing with the Xhoaa, and the Colonial Government was
able to play on their grievances to draw then into an antl-Xhosa alliance.
The Mfengu played no small part in the eventual European victory, and the
Xliosa remember with special bitterness that the Mfengu helped discover
the hidden grain-pite which sustained the Xhosa fighters in the long drawn-
out Frontier War of 1850-3. As a reward for their collaboration, the Mfengu
were granted large tracts of Xhosa land. Since the Mfengu alliance was
cultural as well as military, they acquired the Western skills and education
which enabled them to dominate the better-paid j>bs such aa teachers, clerks,
traders and clergyman. The Xhosa have not yet caught up, with the result that
their historical grievance has acquired social and economic dimensions.
The Xhosa Chiefdore in the PreColonlal Perio£
V.D. Kantnoud-Tooke calls Xhosa chiefdoma "tribal democracies". Inasmuch
a* this quaint term indicates that there was no chiefly despotism, that the
councillors retained considerable power, and that decisions were usually taken
by consensus, he is correct. However, it is important to appreciate that
this desirable state of affairs did not arise from the fact that the Xhosa were
more enlightened or nore humane or had better political theorists than
anyone else. Rather it vaa the product of the balance of forces at the
particular conjuncture of a struggle in which the chiefs were endeavouring to
extend their control over all'spheres of their subjects* lives. The institution
of chief ship was not part of the original dispensation strong the Nguni. The
people vere at one tine organised into clans (kinship groups, or vhat L.H.
Morgan might have celled phretries). At some tine before 1600, certain clans
car?e to dominate others, subdued them and turned then: into conmoners under
their chiefship. Subjection ves acknowledged through the payment of tribute,
and the chief was entitled to certain services, mostly judicial and"Hoilitary,
from hia subjects. There was a limit to what the chief'could demand from
his subjects, tiowever, and these limits were circumscribed by two crucial
determining factors* relative nbundance of land and its converse relative
scarcity of population; and the low level of technology required for
pastoral production. It was impossible for the chiefs to secure their
domination by purely economic means, and their political position was also
not very strong. The nucleus of a chief's personal following was made up
of tha men who had been circumcised with him, and of young men who cane to
serve at his Great Place in return for their bridewealth cattle. Since
land and cattle were readily available, the ease with which a poor man
could set himself up as an independent homestead-head prevented the emer-
gence of a permanent client force. In order to obtain a substantial
following, the chief had to win the support of the influential cocsnoners
known in the ethnographic jargan as clan-section heads. Most of the
commoner clans had broken up, but their senior raerobers (clan-6ection
heads) still commanded the hereditary respect nnd obedience of their
kinsrsen. They were the link between the chief and the vast majority
of home stead-heads who, despite the nominal ownership of the chief, were
the true possessors of the land and cattle of the country. (Once the
chief had accepted the homestead-head aa hie subject, he could not impede
his access to the land, and he could not, except in special circumstances,
appropriate his property.) It was the clan-section heads who executed
the chief's orders, collected hie tribute and furnished hia with warriers.
They are usually known as councillors because they sat on the chief's
council but tbeir power depended on their own followlngs and not on the
favour of the chief. The influence of the councillors was enhanced by
the numbers of chiefs looking for subjects increased every generation.
Dissatisfied councillors could desert singly or en masse** taking their
cattle to a rical chief. Even headstrong chiefs usually backed down In the
face of such a threat. The councillors could even dismiss the chief from
office.
This last statement may seem rather startling to those who are accustomed
to believe that chiefs were born not made, and It therefore seems necessary
to discuss this point in some detaili The ascriptive nature of hereditary
office-holding inhibited but did not eliminate competition between chiefs.
On the surface, the rules are clear enough; all sons of chiefs are chiefs,
and they are ranked according to the rank of their mother. The heir to the
chieftainship Is the son of the Great Wife, who is usually a Thenibu. The
bridewealth for the Great Wife is paid by all the people, and her status is
publicly proclaimed. Yet despite the clarity of the rules, it was possible
to circumvent them. This was made easier by the fact that the Great Wife
vas often married late in life, and that sons often died young, through
illness or war. The political situation was at its most fluid after the
deatU of a chief. The superior rank of the Great Fife could be challenged
by a subsequent bride. It might be alleged that the chief was not the
real father of the Great Son, or that he disowned the heir-apparent1 a wife
before his death. A contender could be eliminated through a witchcraft
accusation. It vaa even possible to depose a recognised chief, and one*?
this was accomplished a reason could always be found. Chiefs have Veen
deposed or superceded for being 'cruel', 'stingy' ofeven 'stupid1. It is
impossible to know to what extent such reasons are simply rationales. In
oral societies even more than literate ones, it ia the victors wbo record
the history. Genealogies, for instance, are less accurate chronicles of
genetic relationships than indexes of relative political standing. To
give two examples from Xhosa history* the chief Mdange, born a minor son, it
today remembared as a Right-Rand Son, and the upstart Mhala ia regarded as
the Great Son of Ndlambe. Political competition of this nature permitted the
most capable chiefs to rise to the highest positions and reduced the ^ ike-
lihood of wf»ll-t^ orn incompetents Viol<Hn# office for very lonp,. Even wore
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important is the fact that it was the most important weapon which the
councillors could use against the attempt of the chiefs to expand the
sphere of their domination.
Since chiefs were unable to retain their position through economic
or military means, they relied largely on ideologicalsanctions and
political manipulation. The chief played a vital role in the first-
fruits (fertility) ritual, was doctored with exclusive magical medicines,
^nd commanded the support of the diviners ("witchdoctors") - no chief was
ever smelt out as a witch* On the political level, they manipulated the
competition^  of the councillors for their favour and benefitted from their
internal dissensions. They made sure that the councillors shared whatever
tribute, gifts or booty was collected. They also exhibited a sense of
group solidarity which limited the extent to which their internal squabbles
damaged their group interests. Chief Ndlambe once told his victorious array
not to pursue his mortal oneir.y Mgqika because* in hia words» "That is a chief,
and you are only ordinary black men." All chiefs exacted tribute, which
meant that although a commoner could escape a particular chief, he could not
escape being dominated by the chiefs as a group.
There can be no doubt that immediately before the Colonial conquest, the
chiefly group was on the offensive, the effect of the Mfecane (Tshalca's Wars)
was to reverse the ir^ aterial conditions which had weakened chieftainship.
Land was no longer sparsely populated, as people clustered together for defence,
and inter-chiefly rivalry within individual polities was severely curtailed.
Chiefs such as Tshaka and Mswati took advantage of these circumstances to
expand their control over production and even women (the mean* of reproduction).
For instance, they appropriated and redistributed cattl*, land and woman,
something the Xhosa chiefs were never able to do. Yet there are signs that
the Xhosa were moving in the same direction, and aggressive and enterprising
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chiefs ouch an Mintsa and NgiUa succeeded In Increasing their political
prerogatives at the expense of their councillors. Nevertheless, by the
time the precolonial period came to an end, the pover of the chiefs among
the Xhosa was by no means as fully established as it was among the northern
Hgunl, and the chiefs usually had to obtain consensus support from the .
councillors for wasurea that they wished approved.
The asault on chiefship
?
When the Ciskei ('British Kaffraria1) was annexed in 1847, it came
under the sway of British liberalism. Regardless of shifts in politics and
policies, and regardless of whether the Government of the day was 'pro-native'
or 'anti-native', the baaic objects of its policy vere remarkably consistent.
These were enunciated as follows by Charles Brotnlee, perhaps the most
widely-respected of Native Administrators and Minister of Native Affairs in
tho first responsible Cape Government: "whatever tends to elevate the Christian-
ize the Natives, whatever tends to diminish the pover of the chiefs, whatever
tends to increase the immovable or not readily movable property of the Natives."8
The close connection between ideological, political and econoraic factors was
very clearly perceived, and every opportunity was taken to induce a taste for
European goods, private property and elected representation. This policy
achieved its niost stature expression with the Gltfft Grey Act, which Rhodes,
then Prime Minister of the Cape Colony, exultently described as a 'Bill for
Africa*.^ Economically, the* main effect of tbe Act would have been the
division of the people into two classes, one of smallholders holding their
plots on individual tenure, And the other of landless labourers, created by
a clause which provided that the plots could not be divided among male heirs.
A further clause, providing for a lnbour-tax, may be dismissed as a short-tern
expedient since it allowed for only three years cotnpulsory labour. The Act
roused so much antagonism arrong Africans that the Government feare^ an armed
rebellion. Moreover, it vas found that it vas not ;<*irticularly ef f ,-\::;ive
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in securing the supply of labour. AB a result, the policy was not persisted
with, and died a Blow death. 1° The Native Trust and Land Act of 1936 marked
the final rejection of individual tenure, and the acceptance that a suitably
modified version of the pre~colonial way of life would be established in the
reserves.
The political counterpart of the attempt to replace communal tenure with
individual land-hcldinfi was the attempted substitution of elected headmen for
hereditary chiefs. At first headmen were appointed, and the Government was
always careful to ensure that all headmen remained well-disposed towards them.
Of necessity, however, many 'headmen' were in fact chiefs and continued to be
regarded as auch by the people. Fven conrnoners who were appointed to head-
nianship hereditary.il The Glen Grey Act attenipted to circumvent this
difficulty be creating councils that were of superior authority to the headmen,
elected by those who held land on individual tenure. The intention was that
educated men, vho had attained their ponition on merit, should be elected as
appropriate counterparts to the emerging class of smallholders whom they
were representing. The councils were also intended to provide an alternative
to direct representation of Africans in the South African Parliament and they
proved so useful in this regard that they were retained and extended long
after the other Glen Grey provisions had been quietly dropped. The extension
of the council system to areas which were still under cotrmunal tenure
increased the proportion of chiefs and headmen, so that they came to dominate
the council too.12
We see then that the turning-point for chlefahip was not the Bantu
Authorities Act of 1951, which formally reconstituted chiefly power but the
failure of the Glen Grey Act of 1894, which marked the high-point of the
liberal attempt to destroy it entirely. The Bantu Administration Act of 1927
formally provided for the recognition of chiefs. The survival of chiefship
during thie period ohould bo acen as part of the wider resistance of tho
Africans to the imposition of Colonial control followirft, the Europenn military
conquest. Cbtefsliip uaa supported because it uas the symbolic focus of the
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cultural, religious, political and economic life of the people, and the chiefs
had beet) in the forefront of resistance to the Europeans. Even today, such
popularity as the chiefs still possess derives from their opposition to the
'Trust' - rehabilitation measures which appear to threaten communal grazing
rights.
Chiefship In the Ciskei
» This is not the place to sunsnarise or take up e position on the
voluminous and controversial literature concerning the introduction of the
policy of separate development. Suffice it to say that by 1948, the chiefs
no longer posed a military threat to the Furopean-dominated South African
j>overmaeut, and the government, for its pnrt, no longer thought to extirpate
chieiship and the vay of life it represented. Moreover, the focus of
conflict had shifted to South Africa's great industrial complexes, and away
froD. the rural frontiers of the initial settlements. The door was therefore
open for a reconciliation between the central government and the chiefs, who
were the ruling elite of the African rural areas.
The tribulations of chiefahiu during the liberal interregnum, and the
consequent support chiefship had received from the rural masses, had
camouflaged a very material shift in the pre-colonial power balance between
chief and people. It will be recalled that the Strength of the people
vis-a-vis the chiefs had rested on four premises (1) abundance of land
(2) shortage of people (3) dependence of the chief on councillors and people
for military support (4) rivalry between chiefs. Premises (1) and (2) had
disappeared through Colonial land confiscation and population increase.
Premises (3) and (4) had disappeared through the Colonial interdiction on
trials of military strength. On the other hand, the chief was still able to
wield his old ideological and political weaponst albeit in a modified form.
Ideologically, he presented himself as the 'father of the people1 w^o had
presided over the 'happy connuuni ty' o£ what a|ipearr<l in retrospect, an
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'pood old days'. In fact, as we hnve seen. It vas not tha chief but the
councillors who had been the guarantors of the people's rights. Politically,
the chief vaa a schemer as before, but whereas he had previously intrigued
among the councillors, these were now powerless and he turned his attention
to roa just rate a and government ethnologists, presenting them with genealogical
and territorial claims which they found difficult to verify or reject. With
regard to the possession of legitimate force, the chief had none of his own
and was forced to rely on that of the South African state, a situation which
placed him In a dependent position.
One stated purpose of the system of Bantu Authorities (Bantu Authorities
Act 1951) vas to revive the institution of chifship as an instrument of
national regeneration, in the hope that this would lead to a more positive
attitude than had been evinced under the old council system.13 Since tha
personnel of the old council system was rauch the s.iiae as that of the new
Tribal Authority (hereafter T/A) system and since their powers vis-a-vis the
wider South African context were also much the same, this was being rather
over-optinistic (if not insincere). In fact, the principal consequence of the
new policy vas to redefine the perirneters and rules of the political arena.
It should be recognised that the South African Coverrment faced certain
difficulties with regard to rationalising chiefly-authority so that it fitted
the requirements of the state. On tha one hand, there was the genuine
problt'.ui of assimilating a patrimonial system of authority to bureaucratic
principles, and on the other, these difficulties provided a series of
opportunities which have been utilised by the chiefs aa an instrument of
political competition and by the Government as an instrument of political
control. In fact, the Issue of chlefship In the Cisket is a prime example
a,
of the way in which ideological argument may be used as the language through
which the real stuff of politics - competition for power - is conducted and,
at tha same time, concealed.
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In setting up the T/AB, the Department of Bantu Administration and
Development (BAD) was confronted by the problems of identifying chiefs and
defining the territorial limits of their authority, ItB theoretical
approach to this problem is Indicated in the following statement by on« of
its ethnologists;
The recognition or appointnent of chiefs is in fact an
administrative act that depends on a number of practical
* considerations. For example, the claimant's right to be
regarded as a chief must be demonstrated genealogically. He
must have a sufficiently large following, and his following must
have its own territory in which it lives. He must be either
independent of other chiefs, or recognised as a chief by A
nupprior of paramount chief. Some of the tribal entities*.
do not aeot the requirements. A number of theia are foreign
enclaves with their own hereditary heads, living as subjects
of other tribes.
Were recognised chiefs already existed, it vas easy enough to recognise
them as heads of tribal authorities. But since there vere not enough
recognised chiefs to operate the sy3tem (in Keiskwcrafihoek District, where
the Clen Grey systen had, perhaps, progressed furthest, there was not a
single recognised chief), and since there were a number of long-standing
chieftaincy claims, the question o€ chiefship had to be reopened.
In j. re-colonial times, all sons of chiefs became chiefs. The Great Son
(or heir) and Right-Send (or second-rank ing) Son were usually the most
important, but otber son3 could claim chiefshipTror their ^ x]iiba_ ('grandfather')
and iqadl ('minor') houses. Claims were often beefed up by connecting
ancestors to higher-ranking tiouses which had died out. For instance, no fewer
than five 6ons of Ngqika (Sandile, Maqoma, Tyhall, Bondasbe, Anta)**
established chlefships which are generally recognised today. Oral genealogies
are notoriously unreliable, and irany were never recorded in writing. Because
of this It was difficult for the best-intentioned of ethnologists to draw a
herd and fact line between a legitimate claimant and a faction led by a
cotranor.fir raerober of the royal clan. In addition, t!~e BAD bad to pass judgment
on int«mnl dynastic qunrrols, such an that which ha4 divided the aioaHleke
of Mrie Location, Kiiifj Wlllianis Town (henceforth KU'T) District, into two
- 12 -
parties oach recognising a different chief - neither of which waa tbe headman.
Hor was it oasy to determine whether a given claimant was the legitimate but
unrecognised chief of an independent chiefdora or the 'hereditary head* of a
subject 'foreign enclave1, since the claimant would inevitably
maintain the former while his nominal superior would inevitably maintain the
letter. The problems surrounding Mfenfcu chlefship are even more intricate,
sincfe the Mfengu are in fact a number of nations, none of which has a royal
clan, although there are royal lineages.
Furthermore, location boundaries did not always coincide with chiefly
allegiances. In Peelton Location, KWT District, the iaiiDange and imiNgqalaai
cliicfdoms were intermingled and at odds. At the other extreme. Chief Ngwenyathi
Makinana of the AiraNdlafthe ruled the whole of ttdantsane District, an area
obviously too large to be administered by a single T/A. In the old Ngqika
areas, particularly in Victoria East District, there verc scattered pocket3
of Xhosa living under Kfengu chiefs and headmen.
These difficulties only became significant with the granting of
internal self-govortncent to the Ciskei in 1968. Here the politics of chiefship
intersected with the politic3 of ethnicity. The rising tide of ethnic hos-
tility manifested itself in the 1973 election with the formation of the mainly
ftfengu Mabandla group (later the Ciskei National Party - CNP) and the mainly
Xhosa Sebe group (latftr the Ciskei National Independence Party - CN1P). The
contest between the two vas very* close, and the Ciskei Legislative Assembly
(30 chiefs, 20 elected members) elected Sebe as Prime Minister by a margin
on only 26 votes to 24. *" The Eebe group had von a convincing majority (13-7)
of the elected members and could claim with some justification that
Mabandla's strength lay primarily in the fact that a disproportionate number
of the recognised chiefs were Mfengu. right chiefship applications wera
. pending (7 Xhosa and 1 Jlfent'u, who turned out to be a Eabe supporter) ,-s.and it
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should be clear that iC they wore granted thin would have the effect of making
the Clskei safe for Sebe. The fact that they were indeed granted, taken
together with the conviction of several 3AT) officials for electoral
irregularities on behalf of the Sebe croup, seems to point to Government
support for Sebe. There can be no doubt that there were ample ethnic grounds
for the recognition of thsse chieftaincies, five of which (imiN<$cj»ngethGlo,
/femaGqunukliwebo-Phate, imiDushane-Qasan;*, imiDange, iraiNgqslasi) vere 'enclaves*
and tvo of which (arcaCfVali, aT^Jirigqi) were resuscitated Xhosa chief ships
which are being reconstituted in Victoria f'ast at thn expense of the Mfongu.
It is also clear that five of the seven cl-si^ wnts had unquestionable rights
to tbo cMefship, But there were other applications, such as that of Velcome
Mnyanda, headmau cf Qugqvala location, KWT District and regarded as chief by
th«i surrounding >ffengu locations, which were turned down. According to
government figures,17 Mnyanda has rwre subjects and a bigger territory than
any of the newly-recognised chiefs, except the italVgcangathelo. This gives
rise to the suspicion that Hnyanda was turned down (as a Hfengu, he might be
considered a potential Mabandla supportRr) on political rather than
ethnographic grounds. The biggest losers by the introduction of the new chief-
v. .; dons vere Chief Mabandla hiciself and Chief Ilakinana (a Rharhabe, but a Mabandla
•tvr
eupporter), both of viliotn had two new T/As carved out of thnir territory.
Incidentally, fc&insna has decided to brenV up his cMefship by allocating
each of the three T/As still under his control to a different eon, lest these
also be lost. This is a particularly good example of chiefshlp conforming
to the adniuistrative etructura rather than the administrative structure
conforming to chieffibip*
Both Ciskeian parties are connitted to chiefaliip aQd mention it
opccifically in tlicir plstforns. This in not ai.ir.;>ly .for electoral purposes,
but becauBe no tnattar which chiefly Rroup (nebe's or -iahamlla 'e) is currently
in favour vitii tl;u Republican government, hoth defend on it for the
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perpetuation of their stntus and privileges they enjoy at the expense of
their people. The CNTP was shle to r;ake considerable political capital
out of >tnbsndl.if8 opposition to the installation of the eight chiefs, and
claimed that he va« opposed to the institution of cMefsbip itself,*8
Mabar.dla va* unable to reply to there charges, but had a traditional card of his
own to play* Ataong his few Bharhabe supporters was no leas a personage than,
the Rhflrhabe Paramount, '•'xolisi Pandile (AI ^ zindlovu!) himself* Mxolisi's
opposition vas popularly ascribed to the influence o£ his Chief Councillor,
Isaac Sangotsha, but it is worth remarking that with the exception of the
Traoskei, the. relations betveeo homelands governments and Paramount Chiefs
have alvays been tanSP. . This is certainly the case in KwaZulu and '.eb'iwa, and
is also true of the analogous situation in Lesotho. Before the Legislative
Assembly was due to elect the ?risr.e Minister, t:xolisi atul two other pro-
Mabandla Kharhabc chiefs ^ade a last-ditch appeal to chiefly solidarity
arguing that if Eebe, whom they alleged to be a corianonert was elected Prime
Minister, "the whole structure of chieftainship vould collapse," Sehe denied
that he was a comaoner and accused the Paraswm.jt of Gaadlins in Ciskei
1 Q
politics* The attitude of the CHIP vas that 'in any country, the King or
Paramount Chief was above party politics"^ an argument also used by the
rulers of KwaZulu and Lesotho, but not, it should -be noted, by those of
his electoral success, lit would appea* tha.t Sebe'e ini'erior s tatus
rankled, we was himself
aescended from a co.nmon&r who h-d di&tinjuished himself during the war of the
AXG (1CJ46-7) c.nd h..u boen awarded mcAiberr,hip of tae Tshawe ± royal house in
in consequence. This was the baois bn wliich beoe cluimed, anu was awai-ued,
cuiei'ehip. a i s claim would nave ucen.valid in tae olu days, whun a l l I'sinawos
were Cliict^, bat Lacri, is no ruat-on WX - apart from contain.>orury pol i t ics -
wiiy aebc cnoulu nave boon turned into - cniuf w.icn IJit-ro arc probably hundreds of
-a uu:;eu:idants of Jhiuf k'huto mio arc no L roco^ni^u au cnicfu.
V
frew th
o undoubtedly wanted an
sited then in 1957. Two other Xhpsa"
ml Gon of the Gqunqkhvoho-Gfaia-f-Yh
a Mfencu-^iief when tho BAD ethnologist
alao claim the. land and people
e mnaTUflthl.^la A reasjjna'ble conclusion is th•ar*S*Uy3'a claito to a cbiefah
as good but no>e'tter than that of Tcany othcra, but that
cl ifefahj.p p f t h e gtnaH-i«t?hi-4.
rrnnndtr
A final insight into the interplay betvcen the ideology of tradition and
the realities of political power is afforded by the struggle for the regency
which occurred after the ^onth of Paxnivount >!xolisi Hnndile on 5 April 1976.**
Pis heir, Maxhoba - Ayakhavuleza who is still a minor, van residing in
Mr;wali Location, Stutterfcein District and V«?in.^  trained for the chieftibip by
Chit».f Kpangele * KharhaT-e chief, who had heen Rumraoned from the Trmiskei for
this purpose. Kxolisi*3 family were strongly of the opinion that his vidow
Kolizve should act ae regent until their son care of ace. The majority of
the Rharhabe chiefs, who were CMIF supporters, saw the opportunity of getting
rid of tha exsbarassin^ anoraalj? of n ?aratr.ount who Rupported the opposition.
They constituted themselves into the f5harhahe Tribunal1 and elected the Jingqi
chief, Lent Maqorca, aa regent. The CNP faction, which backed Nolizve, called
therraelves the fRharbobe Privy Council1. It von the support of Xolilizve
Sigcawu, the Gcaleka Paramount in the Tronskei, and of the Uharhabc chiefs still
rnaident in the Transkex. Since Xolilizwe is, to put it kindly, a political
cipher, it is easy to see the hand of the Tranokei government, which is hostile
to Sefce. Roth tlie Tribunal end the Privy Council held meetings at the Great
Place without attending thoec* of the other group, and both made public
announcements on behalf of the ana Hharhaho aa a vhole. In fact, both were wait-
for the announcement from Pretoria vhich vould decide the issue. Not
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surprisingly, in view its past support for the CNIP, the Republican State
President in his capacity of Supreme Chief of the Bantu approved the appointment
of Maqoroa as from 26 August 1976. The Tribunal moved swiftly to eradicate
traces of the Privy Council* Sangoteha waa expelled from the Great Place,
Nolizwe was packed off to Mgvali and, at the time of writing, Scbo was
negotiating with the Magistrate of Zvelitsha to deport Mpangele to tbe Transkel*
There are still many Xhosa who remain deeply attached to the ideology of
t
chiefly dignity and consensus. Iirvo did not mention the party political
dimensions of the regency struggle at all. The introduction of party politics
was blanod for this sordid little comedy, and reference vas made to the fact
that in the good old days, such thirds never happened. Tbe contending parties
themselves set great store by the idiology of tradition and vere careful to
justify their procedure with reference to traditional precedents. But whereas
the Privy Council group pointed to cases of female regencies, urged tbe
sanctity of the dying wishes of the deceased and those of his family, and insisted
that it was the function of the senior Ccaleka Paramount to give judgment on
tricky legal points, the Tribunal pointed to the years 1829 to 1842 when a;
Maqona had been regent for a Sandile, urged that it was the task of the chiefs
to choose their regent, and insisted that tbe anaFharbabe vere completely
independent of the amaGcaleka. It would be absurd^to ask which of these
versions was closer to traditional procedure. As has already been indicated,
traditional society was no static entity which adhered fixedly to set rules,
but a dynamic and kcRnly competitive society which adapted its rules to suit
changing circumstances. Had such a dispute broken out in precolonial times,
it would undoubtedly have been settled by recourse towar. This would have been
perfectly d«raocratia, as the most popular candidate would have eortmanded the
most spears. Eut once the democratic basis of chiefahip wSa removed and the
opinion of councillors and people had ceased to matter, the contest wan bound
to he fought on the level of official recognition because it is precisely on
this basis that chiefship nov rests.
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Thn change Jn the material baei* cf cMe£f.Mp h«s nffocted not only
the relationship of chief vith chief, hut also the relationship of chinf
vith cocmoner. The main factors underlying thin change have nlready been
analysed, und It remains to discuss Its material manifestations. What
concrete powers to tho chiefs have over their subjects?
Their rcain duty is to enforce the various laws and Inasmuch as these
do not give them more than police powers, their functions in this respect
are ainiply police functions.** Their main area of discretion lies In the
judicial field, where the T/A court hears disputes arising out of customary
law. Tho wny in which these powers can be misused is illustrated In a
meroraraium written on behalf of the Hlubi chief Mnyanda, applying for the
establishment of a separate T/A.25 They are interesting, irrespective of their
truth, hftcnuBP. they outline the possibilities onnn to a chief vho wishes to
impose his authority pn n recalcitrant headman. According to the memorandum:
(a) the headman cannot get his sub~conmitteeG recognised (or funded) by the
chief (b) in cases which appear before the chief's court, decisions £0
constantly against thft hecdi!\an arc bis supporters (c) the chief's court hos
convicted the headman for pffcnc.es (aesnult, holding illegal meetings) he
did not coosalt (d) the headnan's ovn convictions are set aside on appeal to
the chief's court (e) the chief encourages dissident eletnents within thej \
headman's location (f) the hendman and his councillors are exposed to, public
ineult and hunllintlon ot tho chief's Creat Place. These allegatlonc do not
amount to rare than harassicent as the headman vss able to appeal the decisions
of the chief to the na^lstrate's court. In this raspect. It 1B significant
that flpT7« CT^ TP chiefs have requested the abolition of this right of appeal.25A
Orrfinnry conrioners are far worse off than headmen. Their old representatives
the roimcillnrfi, no longer protect there since a chief's council in now rwre
liable than ever to bn wade up of his pareonnl dependent!*. fub-hr,admen are
appointed by the cM.ef inrfpponde.ntly of the administration, and although many
of these arc still clan~fiection heeds, this, liVe conseoaus, la a tradition
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the metoriol hacis of which has fallen away. Although the councillors of
the T/A are olocted, the elected members by no lreans form the majority of
the chief's council, which la not fixed but fluctuating in numbor. Usually
a chief's council is made up largely of his personal, friends and of those
who have icada it thoir business to hang around his Great Place and share in
whatever gifts cone his vay,
f The chief may abuse his judicial power to persecute dissident individuals,
as in tV.e case of the headman mentioned above. There are limitations: the
trial is not a kangaroo court, but taHes place in the T/A building before the
elected council, and the dicisioas can be appealed to the magistrate. Eut
it should bo emphasised that only an extremely enterprising individual who
is unusally avare of his statutory rights would be prepared to take on the
risks and coots involved, unless, like the headman, ho has substantial and
highly nvjtivatcd popular support. Even if a subject successfully opposed his
chief, he could be exposed to persistent harassment and could be deprived of
t'uo riany little services vhich chiefs normally provide for their subjects
(e.g. tha chief often helps bis subjects obtain pensions, and he assists them
in rate ting their bridcuealth obligations). It is difficult, however, for
a chief to impose a punishment more severe than that of a fine. The chief's
control of the land doas not give him the right to expel long-atanding
residents. For instance, vhen Chief Korsani of the iraiNgqalasi wished to rid
hitsself of Mr, n\L» Mapyanya of Peelton, he had to go through tho magistrate of
Zwelitsha.26 Nevertheless threats of expulsion are effective enough to be
employed in elections,*" With regard to corporal punishment, the
decision of the Ntinda T/A to givu Kr. K. Mahayiya ton lashes for ploughing
on Sunday, gavo rise to a public outcry and Mr. Mahayiya^took up the matter
with attorneys,27
The ability of the chiefs to deliver tho voti in elections has not been
demonstrated. The Mfengu chiefs oi: Victoria East wera unable to secure the
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election of the CNP candidates during tha 1973 election* Of the four
constituencies which elect only one representative to the Legislative
Assembly, two h«ve thalr elected representative and their chief sitting on
opposite sides of the house, though In both (Hevu, Kelskannaahoeic) special
circumstances have to be taken into account.
Conclusions
The purposes of this paper have been threefold. First, it has sought to
eet out little-known and inaccessible information about Ciskeian chiefship
Second, it has attempted to show that ideology (In this case, the rules and
procedures of the 'traditional way of life') does not dictate political action,
but that political action can always legitimate itself through one Ideological
rationalisation or another. This was true of preoolonial society In its
succession disputes, and it is equally true of chiefly disputes within the
framework of homeland politics today. Similarly, the precolonial Ideas of
consensus snd good government stemmed from a situation where the chiefs were
unable to subordinate the people and their representatives, the councillors.
Third, it has attempted to show that one cannot divorce the political forms
of chiefahip from their naterial base and still expect them to retain their
old vitality. Precolonial chiefship wen a nultlvfflent Institution linking
economics, politics and religion. The nineteenth century Colonial
administrators understood this and struck at all three simultaneously.
The Republican government's support of chiefehip could not alter (and
probably resulted from) the fact that the material bases of chlefihip had
changed.
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